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U.S. 12 the defendants were convicted for conspiracy to kidnap and
hold for ransom. The kidnappers brought their victim to the house of
the defendants and at gunpoint forced the defendants to permit them
to use it as a hideout from the police for themselves and their victim.
The court found that the kidnappers were not present all the time,
and that there would have been an opportunity to call the police. There-
fore since the threat was not immediate during the commission of some
of the overt acts, the defense of duress would not lie. The courts are
extremely strict in their requirement of immediacy in the threat before
the defense will be available. 13
The rule may seem harsh. The distinction between an immediate
threat and a mediate one appears, at first, to be an unduly academic
rule by which to judge the actions of a prisoner suffering from phy-
sical exhaustion and mental anguish. He may be validly aware that his
life is in jeopardy even though the threat may not have been direct or
immediate but delivered by innuendo or by the obvious attitude of the
captors coupled with the knowledge of the fate of other prisoners. But
the rule is nevertheless sound. If any resistance of our troops is to
be attained when they are captured and taken as prisoners of war it
must be required that resistance be up to the very face of death. If
anything less were required the necessity of resisting would be elimi-
nated altogether. If the defense of duress could be based on the threat
of mediate death, as defense contended, the mere fact of being taken
prisoner would in most cases satisfy that standard. As said by one
court:
"We think that the citizen owing allegiance to the United States
must manifest a determination to resist commands and orders
until such time as he is faced with the alternative of immediate
injury or death. Were any other rule to be applied, traitors in
the enemy country would by that fact alone be shielded from
any requirement of resistance. The person claiming the defense
of coercion and duress must be the person whose resistance has
brought him to the last ditch.'
14
It seems sound to retain the strict rule in determining guilt, and
to consider all lesser circumstances in determining an appropriate sen-
tence.
DAVID A. SCHUENKE
Conditional Sales: Date of Compulsory Resale When Goods Re-
plevied.-Plaintiff sold two pieces of farm machinery to the defend-
ants, the agreement being in the form of a conditional sales contract.
The vendees refused to make any payments on the $1,000.00 unpaid
1276 F.2d 490 (10th Cir. 1935).13 See R.I. Recreation Center Inc. v. Aetna Casualty and Surety Co., 177 F.2d
603 (1st Cir. 1949).
14 192 F.2d 338, at 359 (9th Cir. 1951).
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balance. Unable to secure possession of the equipment through consent
of the buyers, plaintiff instituted a replevin action on the 31st day of
March, 1953. On April 15th following, the vendees voluntarily re-
turned one piece, a harvester, however it was not until the 18th of May,
1953, that the sheriff seized the other unit, a tractor, pursuant to the
writ and gave possession therof to the plaintiff. The trial awarded the
defendants damages on their counterclaims and the plaintiff appealed.
Held: Judgment reversed for the plaintiff. When a conditional vendor
resorts to legal process to retake goods from the possession of a buyer
in default and such action is contested, the thirty day statutory period
for compulsory resale does not commence to run until the final adjudi-
cation in the replevin action. Kahl v. Winfrey, 81 Ariz. 199, 303 P.2d
526 (1956).
The trial court's decision reflected almost complete adoption of the
buyers' counterclaim allegations which consisted of modification, re-
cission, and severability of the contract as well as a claim for statutory
damages for failure to resell. For the lower court to adopt the modifica-
tion theory set forth by the buyers is not of itself unrealistic, however,
to award damages for wrongful retaking and failure to resell the har-
vester within thirty days after April 15th, 1953, is entirely inconsistent
with any form of modification wherein the allegation is that the harves-
ter was returned in cancellation of the unpaid contract price. This
question was dispensed with at the appellate level with the statement
that the buyers had failed in their burden of proof on the matter. The
Arizona Supreme Court's further holding of non-severability on the
basis of the facts presented resulted in classifying both units of equip-
fent as one chattel sold under one contract, and therefore making both
subject to the single writ. The voluntary return of the harvester is im-
material and without impact where the buyers actively resisted return
of the tractor.
The instant case therefore presents the question of when must the
conditional vendor resell as per the Uniform Conditional Sales Act
once he has resorted to legal process to secure the return of the goods
and such action is contested by the buyer in default who has paid at
least fifty percent of the sale price. In resolving this issue, the Arizona
appellate court, deciding the question for the first time, followed the
decisions of the State of Tennessee, specifically adopting the holding
enunciated in Leiberman v. Puckett.1 Although Tennessee has not
enacted the Uniform Conditional Sales Act, their conditional sale sta-
tute is similar in rights and duties of the buyers and sellers respec-
tively.2
Decisions from New York both prior and subsequent to the enact-
'94 Tenn. 273, 29 S.W. 6 (1895).
2. TENN. CODE ANN. §47-1302 (1955).
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ment of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act there in 1922 were dis-
cussed but none were relied on directly by the Arizona appellate court.
Prior to 1933, the New York decisions 3 on this issue were in accord
with the holding adopted in the instant case. It was not until eleven
years after the adoption of the Uniform Conditional Sales Act in
New York that the New York Court overruled their previous position
by holding in Montgomery Acceptance Corp. v. Coon4 that the date of
retaking was the date the sheriff delivered the property to the vendor.
The Coon decision met with apparent disfavor as evidenced by the
legislative amendment 5 of the following year. Effective May 19, 1934,
this statement was added to Sec. 796 of the New York Uniform Condi-
tional Sales Act.
"Provided, however, that when the seller retakes possession of
the goods by legal process, and an answer is interposed the seller
may hold such retaken goods for a period not to exceed thirty
days after the entry of a judgment by a court of competent
jurisdiction entitling the seller to possession of such goods be-
fore holding such resale."
Memoranda 7 presented to the Governor of New York and against
passage of the bill fairly outline the advantages and objections to the
proposed amendment. In the report submitted to the governor by the
sponsor of the bill,8 conversion was suggested as a probable conse-
quence should the seller resell in conformity with the law of the Coon
case, when the replevin action subsequently determines that the seller
was not entitled to the goods. On the other hand, also following the
decision of the Coon case, the seller cannot await determination of the
replevin action without subjecting himself to statutory liability for fail-
ure to resell within the prescribed time. Both the Association of the Bar
of the City of New York and the New York County Lawyers' Associa-
tion favored passage of the amendment.9
The only objections urging the governor's veto were contained in
a brief prepared for a business organization.10 It was suggested by the
3 Siegel v. Frank E. Hatch & Co., 61 Misc. 332, 113 N.Y. Supp. 818 (1908)
Spitaleri v. Brown, 163 App. Div. 644, 148 N.Y. Supp. 1005 (1914).
4263 N.Y. 561, 189 N.E. 697 (1933).
5 N. Y. SEss. LAWS ch 728 (1934).6 N.Y. PERSONAL PROPERTY LAW, §79, Part 2 (1956).
7 Photostatic copies of the reports contained in the bill jacket were received
from the New York State Law Library.
8 Assemblyman Harold B. Ehrlich's letter to Governor Herbert H. Lehman,
dated May 12, 1934.
9The Committee on State Legislation of the Association of the Bar of the
City of New York issued a Bulletin No. 258 in 1934 approving the proposed
bill. The New York County Lawyers' Association approval was contained in
a report sent to Governor Herbert H. Lehman on May l1th, 1934, by Irving
J. Joseph, Chairman of the Committee on Legislation and Law Reform.
10 H. G. Bragg, general manager of the Automobile Merchants' Association
of New York, Inc., under letter dated May 10th, 1934, enclosed a brief out-
lining the points requiring its veto.
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opponents that: "Revision should be effected only after deliberate con-
sideration of the many technicalities involved.. . ." The main objection
dealt with the ambiguity in construction as precipitating needless litiga-
tion. Specifically, the objecting association felt that the legislature had
intended to give the conditional vendor an option to either consider the
date of retaking as being the date of delivery of the goods by the sher-
iff or the date of final entry of a judgment. It was suggested how-
ever, that this intent might not be carried out, the reason being that
the court might place a construction on the amendment which would
limit the resale period to the thirty days following entry of a judgment.
The fears epressed in the merchants' association report were recently
allayed with the case of Genauer v. Bac Corp.," where the New York
Court held that the resale could be conducted during pendency of the
replevin action as well as not later than thirty days after the entry
of a judgment therein.
Of the nine Uniform Conditional Sales Act States,12 Indiana alone
has followed New York in this respect. The Indiana statute 3 contains
the New York amendment verbatim with the exception of the phrase,
"and an answer is interposed." No cases have been decided construing
the provision.
In view of the fact that Pennsylvania 4 and Massachusetts' 5 have
enacted the Uniform Commercial Code, it might be well to consider
those provisions of the 1957 draft which involve the issue of resale
after retaking by legal process. With the exception of consumer goods,
the Uniform Commercial Code does not provide for any definite time
limit in which the seller must dispose of the retaken goods.' 6 In the
case of consumer goods, 17 however, the seller must dispose of them
within ninety days after possession is taken. The statute', dealing with
compulsory disposition of consumer goods makes no reference as to
what shall constitute the date of possession when legal process is ne-
cessary to retake them. It is likely therefore, that the issue presented
11276 App.- Div. 589, 96 N.Y.S.2d 394 (1950).
"2Arizona, Delaware, Indiana, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, South
Dakota, West Virginia, and Wisconsin. See 2 U.L.A., UNIFORM CONDITIONAL
SALES AcT.
"3 BURNS' IND. ANN. STATS. §58-517 (1951).
14 The UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE took effect July 1st, 1954, in Pennsylvania.
15 Massachusetts passed the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE on October 1st, 1957.
16 Sec. 9-504 of the UNIFORM COMMIERCIAL CODE which concerns the seller's
right to dispose of the goods after default, simply provides that the method,
manner, time, place, and terms of the disposition must be "commercially
reasonable." No resale period is stipulated for it is the intent and purpose of
the section to foster private sales through regular commercial channels.1 Under §9-505(1) of the UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, disposition of consumer
goods after default of the buyer, must be made within ninety days, "If the
debtor has paid sixty per cent of the cash price in the case of a purchase mon-
ey security interest in consumer goods or sixty per cent of the loan in the case
of another security interest in consumer goods .... "
I UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE §9-505.
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by the instant case will arise under the Uniform Commercial Code
in the area of retaken consumer goods. Sec. 19 of the Uniform
Conditional Sales Act provides for resale within thirty days, "After
the seller has retaken possession." Sec. 9-505 (1) of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code provides for liability for failure to dispose of the goods
within ninety days, "After he takes possession." Unless the word pos-
session in the latter phrase be interpreted to mean judicial as well as
peaceful possession, it would appear that the Uniform Commercial
Code has not completely eliminated the problem of resale after retaking
by legal process.
Wisconsin has not passed on the precise issue presented by the in-
stant case, however Wisconsin has adopted the language of the Model
Uniform Conditional Sales Act Sec. 19.19 In considering amendment
of the Wisconsin Statute,20 it is suggested that the Indiana version be
adopted. By not requiring an answer to be interposed, it apparently
eliminates a troublesome area present in the New York amendment.
Under the New York version, it appears incumbent on the conditional
vendor to proceed to conduct the resale as soon as the goods are de-
livered to him by the sheriff, for it is likely that unless he do so, he
will fail to resell within the thirty day period should the vendee refuse
to contest the action.21 Construction of the Indiana provision, on the
other hand, would quite probably allow the vendor thirty days after
entry of judgment in which to conduct the resale, regardless of wheth-
er such judgment be obtained on the merits or by default.
ROBERT CHOINSKI
Pleading: Adding Parties by Intervention - Plaintiff, a New
York corporation engaged in the business of buying dairy products
for purposes of manufacture, brought an action against the attorney
general and other state officers for a judgment that a Wisconsin
Statute1 be declared unconstitutional. The Pure Milk Products Co-
operative petitioned for intervention on the ground that, by the terms
of its marketing agreement with its producing members, it was their
collective agent authorized to represent them in selling milk to pur-
19"If the buyer does not redeem the goods within ten days after the seller
has retaken possession, and the buyer has paid at least fifty per cent of the
purchase price at the time of the retaking, the seller shall sell them at public
auction in the state where they were at the time of the retaking, such sale
to be held not more than thirty days after the retaking ..
20 WIs. STATS. §122.19 (1955).
21 This same obj ecion was presented in the merchants association brief, see note
10 supra.
iVxs. STATS. §100.22 (1955): "One engaged in buying milk, cream, or butter-
fat for the purpose of manufacture, who pays a higher rate for such products
in one section of the state than in another, shall be guilty of unfair discrim-
ination, unless the price differential be commensurate with quantity, quality,
or transportation charges."
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